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Abstract 
Enrolment rates to higher education reveal quite large variation over time which 
cannot be explained by productivity shocks alone. We develop a human capital 
investment model in an overlapping generations framework that features 
endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education. Agents are heterogeneous in 
their beliefs about future wage differentials. An evolutionary competition between the 
heterogeneous beliefs determines the fraction of the newborn generation having a 
certain belief. Costly access to information on the returns to education induces 
agents to use potentially destabilizing backward looking prediction rules. Only if 
previous generations experience regret about their human capital investment 
decisions, agents will choose a more sophisticated prediction rule that dampens the 
cycle. Access to information becomes key for stable flows to higher education.  
 
Keywords: expectations, human capital investment, endogenous fluctuations, inter-
generational spill-overs, evolutionary dynamics, bifurcation analysis 
JEL-classification: C60, E32, J24 
 
 
Zusammenfassung  
Einschreibungen an Fachhochschulen und Universitäten weisen starke zyklische 
Schwankungen auf, die nicht allein durch Produktivitätsschocks erklärt werden 
können. Es wird ein Humankapitalmodell mit überlappenden Generationen 
vorgestellt, das die Eigenschaft besitzt, Zyklen in der Nachfrage nach Bildung 
endogen zu erklären. Im Modell sind die Akteure heterogen in Bezug auf ihre 
Voraussagen über zukünftige Lohndifferentiale. Ein evolutionärer Wettbewerb unter 
den Voraussagemethoden bestimmt den Anteil der Akteure, der ein bestimmtes 
Prognoseinstrument verwendet. Da der Zugang zu Informationen über zukünftige 
Humankapitalrenditen mit Kosten verbunden ist, weichen die Akteure auf 
vergangenheitsorientierte Voraussagemethoden aus, die destabilisierend wirken 
können. Nur dann, wenn frühere Generationen die Art und Weise wie sie 
prognostizierten bereuen, werden die Akteure kompliziertere, zukunftsgerichtete, 
Prognoseinstrumente wählen, welche die Zyklen dämpfen. Damit werden leicht 
verfügbare Informationen über Arbeitsmarktentwicklungen zur Schlüsselvariablen für 
konstante Zugänge zu Fachhochschulen und Universitäten, aber auch anderen 
Bildungsträgern. 
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1 Introduction
Enrollment rates to higher education vary over time. This holds true for many
countries and educational fields. College enrollment rates in the U.S. fluctuated
between 37% and 47% in the years from 1968 to 1988, where controlling for
individual and regional effects does not cancel out the dynamics (Dellas and
Sakellaris 1995). Time series for Sweden indicate a variation of college enroll-
ment rates of 20 to 24 year old men between 34% and 46% in the years from
1963 to 1991 (Topel 1997). For engineering degrees at universities, Germany
was confronted with enrollment rates between 8% and 12% of all graduates from
upper secondary schooling from 1975 to 1998. For those students enrolling to
non-university type of higher education, rates changed between 32% and 52% of
all graduates with a specialized upper secondary degree (Neugart 2001). Free-
man (1976b) shows for various fields of study the dynamics of enrollments to
U.S. colleges.1
There is a large literature aiming to explain changes in the demand for
higher education with variations in expected relative wages. Approaches taken
so far may be divided according to the way how agents’ expectations are mod-
elled.
Backward looking expectations postulate that students, entering higher ed-
ucation programs, form expectations on future relative wages using past expe-
riences. What counts in the ‘cost-benefit’ analysis that underlies the human
capital investment decision is actual wages, or most recently paid wages, rela-
tive to what could be earned without investment into schooling. There is time
series evidence, usually on the basis of dynamic regression models, that finds
enrollment rates driven by backward looking expectations (Freeman 1975a and
1975b, Freeman 1976a, Borghans et al. 1996, Duchesne and Nonneman 1998,
Quinn and Price 1998, Card and Lemieux 2000).
On the other hand, one may employ rational expectations. This assumes
that agents make unbiased forecasts on future relative wages. Zarkin (1983,
1985) and Siow (1984) have estimated rational expectations models for enroll-
ments of teachers and lawyers, respectively. Both find support for the hypoth-
esis of rationally forecasting agents.
Reviewing the literature on the demand for education Freeman (1986) con-
cludes, that, when assuming backward looking expectations, the internal mar-
ket structure can generate cobweb type of ‘ups’ and ‘downs’ in enrollment rates.
However, the estimated models would imply damped oscillations. To arrive at
continued oscillations one would have to recur to large shocks. Such shocks
are also needed if one wants to explain cyclical behavior in enrollment rates
under the assumption of rational expectations. Clearly, both approaches shift
the attention to factors that lie outside the labor market.
The aim of our paper is to offer an endogenous explanation of enrollment
dynamics. Even though we focus on internal forces, we do not think that
exogenous shocks shifting the demand side of the labor market should be ruled
1A collection of data on enrollments for a large range of countries can be found on the homepage
of the UNESCO http://unescostat.unesco.org/en/stats/stats0.htm. The compendium by Titze et al.
(1986, 1993) contains time series on enrollments for all major subjects for Germany going back to
1820. The fluctuations shown there are quite striking.
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out as a potential cause. However, the role of exogenous shocks may be less
important than needed to explain continuing large fluctuations in enrollments.
We develop a human capital investment model with overlapping genera-
tions. Agents, deciding on whether to invest into schooling, use either a costless
backward looking predictor or incur costs for making a more sophisticated pre-
diction on future relative wages. The predicted wage rate then determines the
schooling decision. An evolutionary competition between the different forecast-
ing rules determines the fraction of the agents in the newborn generation that
uses a certain forecasting rule. This competition is driven by the performance
of backward looking agents of the previous generation. Thus, inter-generational
spill-overs guide the new born generation in their choice of the predictor rule.
They are more likely to predict with a sophisticated mechanism, given that
access to information on returns to human capital investments is costly, if
the previous generation did poorly with the backward looking predictor. The
dynamics of the model are such that backward looking expectations may desta-
bilize enrollments, very much in the the spirit of an unstable cobweb. However,
oscillations will be bounded as agents switch to a forward looking predictor if
the previous, mostly naive population, regrets its schooling decision.
The policy conclusion from the analysis is that easing access to information
on human capital investments can stabilize flows to education. This may help
avoiding situations where universities are flooded with students so that capacity
constraints are hit, unless costly excess capacity is held. Policies that stabilize
flows to universities may also raise the quality of education that generally suffers
from overcrowded universities.
Evolutionary belief formation is key in our augmented human capital model
with which we try to give an endogenous explanation for cycles in the demand
for higher education. There has been a number of recent contributions to the
literature that consider an evolutionary competition between heteregeneous
beliefs. One strand of the literature uses genetic algorithms to model this evo-
lutionary competition. Applications of this approach to models of the cobweb
type can be found in Arifovic (1994), Dawid and Kopel (1998) and Franke
(1998). The latter finds, as do we in our analysis on dynamics in the demand
for education, that increased evolutionary pressure destabilizes the economy.
Another strand of the literature uses the methodology from dynamical systems
theory to study the evolutionary competition between heterogeneous beliefs in
more stylized and less computationally intensive models. Our paper falls in this
strand of the literature and is closely related to the work of Brock and Hommes
(1997) who show that an evolutionary competition between heterogeneous be-
liefs in a cobweb model might lead to endogenous fluctuations. Competition
between trading strategies or behavioral rules, and the choice of one over the
other based on past performance, has also been shown to generate complicated
dynamics in models of financial markets (see for example Brock and Hommes
1998, Lux 1998, Chiarella 1992) and Cournot competition (Droste, Hommes
and Tuinstra 2002). That the inclusion of heterogenous beliefs in models on
market activity can reveal interesting results in terms of the dynamical prop-
erties of market systems is also the subject of Barucci (1999), who shows that
introducing heterogeneous beliefs may lead to a smaller stability region in for-
ward looking economic models as compared to single agent models. Moreover,
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just as in our model, in his heterogeneous beliefs model flip and Neimark-Sacker
or Hopf bifurcations occur.
The notion of ‘not-so-rational’ agents in our model relates to survey evidence
for European and U.S. college students on motives for studying (Brunello, Lu-
cifora and Winter-Ebmer 2001, and Betts 1996, respectively). The former find,
based on survey data of more than 6000 college students, that the average ex-
pected college wage gains are larger than estimated actual wage gains. In their
study overoptimistic students expect to earn far more than 10% over what they
actually will. The latter, with U.S. data, also finds overestimation of wage gains
from college attendance of approximately 10%. Both results seem to indicate
that the enrollment decision is not based on a rational forecast. However, as
it is evidence for a specific year in each data set only, it does not yield insight
into whether beliefs change over time. That gap may be filled with simulation
studies as they can be found in (Borghans et al. 1996 and Neugart 2001). In
both papers a model for enrollments to higher education based on backward
looking expectations is estimated. The model is then used to generate a time
series on hypothetical enrollments, that is, enrollments had students known
the actual wage at the time of graduation. Comparing hypothetical and actual
enrollments gives information on how many students would have or would not
have chosen schooling had they known the future labor market status. All we
want to state here with respect to these findings is that the number of students
making the ‘wrong’ decisions varies over time quite substantially. Certainly,
not having the right forecast may be due to frequent shocks to the market.
However, those would have to be rather marked.
The inter-generational spill-over effect in the belief formation of our agents
can be put into the context of other models where the schooling decision is also
a function of the social environment. Externalities, so far investigated, were
either intra- or inter-generational. Bala and Sorger (1998, 2001) study the
former in a spatio-temporal set-up. There, returns on human capital invest-
ments do not only depend on the agent’s effort but also on the human capital
endowment of so called peer groups. Good neighborhoods, or skilled socially
relevant fellow agents, may have a positive impact on human capital accumula-
tion and vice versa. One important policy implication from such models is that
with intra-generational spill-overs one may observe an endogenous formation
of skilled and un-skilled agents over space. Removing credit constraints does
not necessarily shut off stratification. Inter-generational spill-overs play central
roles in Orazem and Tesfatsion (1997) and de la Croix (2001). The overlapping
generations model of Orazem and Tesfatsion (1997) consists of multiple dynas-
ties. In lack of an adequate predictor on future wages, students learn from their
parents whether it pays to invest into schooling. Higher observed returns on
education of the parents induces their children to increase effort. Orazem and
Tesfatsion (1997) study the impact of taxing adults on the schooling decision of
their children. In de la Croix (2001) a new born generation inherits aspirations
and human capital of the previous generation. While a high human capital
level serves as a positive incentive to invest in ones own education, high aspira-
tions carry the opposite sign. The composite effect on the current generations’
consumption behavior may be such that consumption is too high, given current
productivity growth. The new generation may not invest into human capital
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enough to keep the economy growing. Depending on the relative strength of
the two externalities the economy may run into a poverty trap or cycle along
a growth path.
Studying heterogenous beliefs in the schooling decision may also contribute
to the interpretation of estimates on schooling behavior. Manski (1993) already
emphasized the lack of evidence that prevailing assumptions on expectations
are correct. Moreover, he indicated that incorrect assumptions on expectations
may lead to biases in empirical estimates of schooling choices. The reason is
that it is impossible to tell how students make their schooling decisions from
observing schooling choices as long as one does not know how students perceive
the returns to schooling. Observing the choices and the returns only allows to
determine a function for schooling choices, if one assumes a specific expectation
rule. If the assumption on expectations is false, however, so will be the estimates
of the schooling choice. Clearly, a better understanding of how expectations
are formed is required.
Our paper is organized in the following way. We first sketch a general model
with respect to consumers, firms and evolutionary belief formation when agents
live for two periods and generations overlap. The next section develops a more
specific model. It is assumed that agents choose between a naive and a rational
predictor. A numerical example is introduced for which the dynamic properties
are studied analytically and with computational methods. Section 4 presents
an evolutionary competition between two other forecasting rules: steady state
forecasters – agents that know the long run wage differential between high-
skilled and low-skilled work – and ‘adaptive’ forecasters. Dynamical features,
similar to those found in Section 3 emerge in this framework, but also other
bifurcation routes are possible. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of the main results
can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The firms
The economy consists of a sector H and a sector L which produce the same
commodity. Sector H employs high-skilled labor, sector L employs low-skilled
labor. We assume that both sectors use labor as the only factor of production.
Firms in sector L produce according to a constant returns to scale production
technology, implying a constant real wage rate for low-skilled labor which we
normalize to unity. Demand for low-skilled labor is perfectly elastic at this
real wage of 1. Firms in sector H produce according to a concave production
technology f(l). Profit maximization yields a decreasing demand function for
high-skilled labor ld(wt) as the solution to f ′(l) = wt, where wt denotes the
real wage rate for high-skilled labor in period t.
2.2 The consumers
We assume an overlapping generations structure, where in each period t a
continuum of agents of mass one is born that lives for two periods. Agent i
has private costs of effort ei for investing into education. These effort costs
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are distributed according to some distribution function F with support [0, 1].
Agents have one time unit in each period of their life. They can use part of their
time endowment in the first period of their life for investing into education. If
they invest into education they acquire certain skills which allow them to work
in sector H in the second period of their life. If they do not invest in education
they will have to work in sector L all of their life. The choice whether or not to
invest into education is made in the beginning of the first period of their life,
right after they observe the market clearing wage rates in sectors H and L.
An agent born in period t has a lifetime utility function
U (ct, ct+1) ,
where ct and ct+1 denote consumption in period t and t + 1, respectively. We
will assume that this utility function is monotonic, strictly concave and twice
differentiable. Furthermore, we assume that marginal utility of consumption
in the first period approaches infinity as consumption in the first period ap-
proaches zero, that is limct→0
∂U
∂ct
=∞.
If agent i decides to invest in education his consumption levels will be
ct = 1 − ei and ct+1 = wt+1. Effort costs can therefore be interpreted as
the fraction of time that a young agent has to spend on education to acquire
the skills for working in the high-skill sector in the second period of his life. If
an agent does not invest in education and decides to work in sector L all of
his life, he incurs no effort costs. His consumption will then be ct = ct+1 = 1.
Notice that we assume that agents cannot transfer income from one period to
the next.
Agent i will invest in education if he expects lifetime utility to be at least
as large as when he would not be investing into education. Hence, investment
into human capital will occur if and only if
U
(
1− ei, wet+1
) ≥ U (1, 1) ,
where wet+1 refers to expectations, formed in period t, on real wages to be paid
in sector H in t + 1. By equating these utility levels we find the marginal
effort level, that is the effort level for which an agent is indifferent between
investing and not investing into human capital. Denote this marginal effort
level by e∗t = e
(
wet+1
)
. Note that, by our assumption on marginal utility, this
marginal effort level always exists for wet+1 > 1. Since utility is decreasing
in the effort level all agents with ei < e
(
wet+1
)
will invest in schooling. As
the effort level is distributed on [0, 1], the fraction of the generation born at
time t, with wage expectation wet+1, that invests in education will be equal to
F
(
e
(
wet+1
))
. Notice that e
(
wet+1
)
as well as F
(
e
(
wet+1
))
are upward sloping
in wet+1 as U (1− e, w) is downward sloping in e and upward sloping in w.
Clearly, the decision whether to invest in schooling depends upon the ex-
pected wage. In this paper, we assume that there are several ways in which
agents may predict the wage rate. Let there be K different of these predic-
tors wk,t+1, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K. Since information requirements of the different
predictors will differ, it seems reasonable to assume that different amounts
of information costs have to be paid for these predictors. In particular, the
more sophisticated predictors will require more time and effort to implement
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than very simple forecasts, for example because agents have to consult job
counsellors or collect and process information on labor market forecasts. Each
member of the population uses one of the predictors. The size of the fraction of
the population of consumers using a predictor depends, apart from the predic-
tor’s information costs, upon the past success of this predictor. Hence, inter-
generational spill-overs drive the belief formation process. In fact, the predictor
choice of the new generation will depend on the level of (dis)satisfaction with
the forecast methods of agents from the previous generation. Let nkt denote
the fraction of the population using predictor k in period t. Clearly, we must
have
∑K
k=1 nkt = 1. Assuming that beliefs are independently distributed across
the population of consumers, total enrollment in schooling in period t will be
given by
Et = E(w1,t+1, w2,t+1, . . . , wK,t+1) =
K∑
k=1
nktF (e(wk,t+1)) .
We will abstract from dropouts and will assume that everybody that enrolls in
schooling in period t, indeed acquires the necessary skills and supplies his labor
to the market for high-skilled labor in period t+1. Total supply of high-skilled
labor in period t+ 1 will therefore be
ls (w1,t+1, . . . , wK,t+1) =
K∑
k=1
nktF (e(wk,t+1)) .
2.3 Market equilibrium
The next step is to investigate equilibrium on the market for high-skilled labor.
The market clearing condition for period t+ 1 becomes
ld (wt+1) =
K∑
k=1
nktF (e (wk,t+1)) . (1)
Denote by w∗ the unique solution to ld (w) = F (e (w)). Furthermore, let
ldw ≡ ∂l
d
∂w (w
∗) < 0 and lsw ≡ F ′ (e) e′ (w∗) > 0 correspond to the slopes of
the labor demand curve and the labor supply curve, respectively, evaluated
at the steady state. The relative sizes of these derivatives play an important
role in the dynamics of the full model, as will become clear shortly. Equa-
tion (1) implicitly defines the market equilibrium wage in period t + 1 as
a function of the set of predictors wk,t+1 and corresponding fractions nkt as
wt+1 = G (w1,t+1, . . . , wK,t+1, n1t, . . . , nKt).2
Let us now try to determine whether a solution wt+1 to the market clearing
condition (1) always exists. Notice that a wedge will be driven between enroll-
ments in education in period t and supply of high-skilled labor in period t+1 if
the realized wage in period t+1 is not larger than the wage for low-skilled labor,
that is, when wt+1 ≤ 1. If wt+1 < 1, even the high-skilled workers will supply
2If one of the predictors corresponds to rational expectations or perfect foresight (as in the next
section), i.e. wet+1 = wt+1, the realized market equilibrium wage also turns up in the right hand side
of the market equilibrium condition (1).
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their labor to sector L (where the demand for labor is perfectly elastic). Sup-
ply of high-skilled labor will then be 0. If wt+1 > 1 total supply of high-skilled
labor will be Et ≥ 0 (which is independent of wt+1 if none of the predictors cor-
responds to rational expectations and upward sloping if some of the agents are
rational). Finally, if wt+1 = 1 high-skilled workers are indifferent between sup-
plying their labor to sector H or sector L. It follows that, given that ld (wt+1)
is downward sloping, sufficient conditions for a market equilibrium to always
exist are f ′ (0) > 1, and liml→∞ f ′ (l) ≤ 1.
2.4 Information costs and predictor choice
A newborn generation faces the problem of choosing between different predic-
tors. We now consider how agents decide which forecasting rule they should
use. Those agents from the previous period that have not predicted the wage
rate correctly might have made the wrong schooling decision. Therefore they
might regret their decision. Together with the associated information costs this
regret determines the total perceived costs of using a predictor. Notice that
the probability of making the wrong decision will be lower for more accurate
predictors. We assume that agents utilize the experience of the previous gen-
eration for the predictor choice. The information flow from the old generation
to the newborn agents can be interpreted as learning or, as we are going to call
it, inter-generational spill-overs. Information relevant for the predictor choice
is carried over from generation to generation. One may think of the media
spreading this information.
Members of the new generation compare costs of using different predictors.
On the one hand, these are the costs that accrue from collecting information
about future wage rates. Predicting in a more accurate way than just taking
the current situation on the labor market as a cheap predictor, may require
consulting employment offices or job counsellors, or finding the relevant fore-
casts of research institutes that have expertise. On the other hand, agents
expect to face costs from using a cheaper predictor that possibly does not give
the correct information on returns to education. These expected costs of an
incorrect schooling decision are approximated by the aggregate regret of the
previous generation.
For a formal treatment of the inter-generational spill-overs we have to spec-
ify the level of regret for members of the previous generation that have used
predictor k. All agents i with an effort level for schooling ei of ei ≤ e (wk,t+1),
go into schooling. After the realization of wt+1 their ex post preferred decision
is to enter schooling when ei ≤ e (wt+1). Therefore, as long as expectations do
not equal realized wages (wt+1 6= wk,t+1), some agents using predictor k would
have preferred to make another schooling decision. We can distinguish between
two cases: i) wt+1 < wk,t+1 and ii) wt+1 > wk,t+1.
Figure 1 illustrates these cases for the uniform distribution. Consider the
first case. Here, all agents with e (wt+1) < ei < e (wk,t+1) will regret their
decision to invest in human capital. Had they known the actual wage, they
would not have spent effort on schooling. We can measure the size of their
regret or dissatisfaction by comparing their actual utility with the utility they
would have got, had they made the correct decision. Their actual (realized)
7
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Figure 1: Illustration of the construction of aggregate regret. Left panel: critical
values of e (wt) and e (wt+1) for wt+1 < wt. Right panel: critical values of e (wt) and
e (wt+1) for wt+1 > wt.
utility will be
U (1− ei, wt+1) .
Given that the market wage is lower than they expected, they would have
rather chosen not to invest into their human capital and work in the low-skill
sector in the second period of their life. That choice would have given them a
utility of
U (1, 1) ,
which we will refer to as their potential utility. The cost of using predictor
k for an agent with effort cost ei ∈ (e (wt+1) , e (wk,t+1)) will therefore be the
difference between potential and actual utility. That is
R (ei, wt+1) = U(1, 1)− U(1− ei, wt+1).
It follows from e (wt+1) < e < e (wk,t+1) that R (ei, wt+1) > 0. Summing up
regret for all agents with predictor k we find aggregate regret R (wk,t+1, wt+1),
which is
R (wk,t+1, wt+1) =
∫ e(wk,t+1)
e(wt+1)
R (e, wt+1) dF (e) . (2)
Notice that R (wt+1, wt+1) = 0.
Now consider the other possibility, wt+1 > wk,t+1. Then, all agents using
predictor k and with effort costs ei ∈ (e (wk,t+1) , e (wt+1)), have decided to
work in the low-skill sector in the second period of their life, but will regret
this decision. They would have invested in human capital had they known
the actual wage, which is now higher than they expected. We again consider
the difference between potential utility, corresponding to investing in schooling,
and actual utility, corresponding to working in sector L, which will be
U(1− ei, wt+1)− U (1, 1) = −R (ei, wt+1) ,
with e (wk,t+1) < ei < e (wt+1). Summing up regret for all naive agents and
swapping the bounds of the integral, we find aggregate regret as
R (wk,t+1, wt+1) =
∫ e(wk,t+1)
e(wt+1)
R (ei, wt+1) dF (e) .
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This expression equals the one of the first case.
Having computed aggregate regret, the final step is to determine the frac-
tion of the newborn population that decides to use the rational predictor. We
assume that agents of the newborn generation observe the set of aggregate re-
grets R (wk,t+1, wt+1) of the old generation. This information may be available
from newspapers that report on how satisfied agents of the former generation
are with their schooling decision. It may also be transferred to the new gen-
eration by socially relevant agents of the older generation. In one way or the
other, newborn agents develop a feeling for the extent of regret in the society.
They compare aggregate regret, which is their (naive) estimator of their own
regret should they choose predictor k, with information costs Ck associated
with using predictor k. We suggest the following relationship for the fraction
of the population using a certain rule:
nk,t+1 = Hβ (R (w1,t+1, wt+1) + C1, . . . , R (wK,t+1, wt+1) + CK) . (3)
The parameter β tunes how fast agents respond to differences in costs.
Our full model of human capital investment with heterogeneous beliefs is
now given by equations (1) and (3). In the next two sections we will investigate
more specific examples of this framework. However, before going into this we
will briefly discuss an alternative model where predictor choice is based upon
individual regret instead of aggregate regret.
An argument for using individual regret is that private costs of effort may
also influence the schooling decision. In particular, for people with a very low
(high) effort level it is very likely that they will invest in schooling (not invest
in schooling). Therefore their predictor choice matters less than for people with
intermediate effort levels. This might lead one to use individual regret levels
as the main determinant of predictor choice. This requires a slightly different
set-up of the model. Now, each agent born in period t belongs to a dynasty
i. Dynasties are characterized by agents that have the same private costs of
effort ei. An agent born in period t+ 1 learns his effort level ei, as well as the
individual regret R (ei, wt+1) from his “parents” (compare with, for example,
Orazem and Tesfatsion 1997). Now consider the case where agents can choose
between the perfect foresight forecast and the naive forecast. The newborn
agent uses the parents’ individual regret as an estimate of his own individual
regret. If the parent had perfect foresight, it informs its offspring about the
individual regret he would have had with naive expectations. This individual
regret is then compared with the information costs Ck in order to come up with
a predictor choice. Simulation with this version of the model show qualitatively
similar dynamical features as the model discussed in the present paper.
3 Rational versus naive predictions
In the literature on demand for education two types of expectation formation
processes are typically considered. Usually, human capital models assume ratio-
nal expectations (see, for example, Becker 1975). Rational expectations imply
that agents know how the economy works. Since the model is completely de-
terministic, rational expectations coincide with perfect foresight. Therefore,
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agents can perfectly forecast the wages, i.e. wet+1 = wt+1. On the other hand,
many contributions employ naive expectations (see Freeman 1986) where it is
assumed that agents predict wages using the most recent wage observation, i.e.
wet+1 = wt. In this section, we try to merge these two approaches, by allowing
agents to choose between these two prediction rules. First we will discuss the
general set-up of this model and then we turn to a numerical example.
3.1 General set-up
Let us denote the fraction of rational forecasters in period t as nt. Hence, 1−nt
corresponds to the fraction of naive forecasters. We furthermore assume that
the naive predictor can be obtained for free and that the rational predictor can
be obtained at a fixed cost Cr > 0. The market clearing condition (1) becomes
ld (wt+1) = ntF (e (wt+1)) + (1− nt)F (e (wt)) . (4)
The steady state equilibrium wage w∗ corresponds to the unique solution to
ld (w) = F (e (w)). Equation (4) implicitly defines the market clearing wage
wt+1 as a function of wt and nt, say wt+1 = G (wt, nt). We consider the
following specification for the evolution of the fraction of rational players
nt+1 = Hβ (Cr, R (wt, wt+1)) = H (β (R (wt, wt+1)− Cr)) ,
where H ′ (y) > 0, limy→−∞H (y) = 0 and limy→∞H (y) = 1. Here β measures
how sensitive the newborn generation is with respect to the cost differential. A
high value of β implies a high level of evolutionary competition between the two
forecasting rules. The full model corresponds to the following two-dimensional
system of first order difference equations
wt+1 = G (wt, nt) , (5)
nt+1 = H (β (R (wt, G (wt, nt))− Cr)) .
The following proposition discusses the steady state of this dynamical system
and its local stability properties.
Proposition 1 The steady state of the dynamical system (5) is
(w∗, n∗) = (w∗,H (−βCr)) .
This steady state is locally stable if
∣∣ldw∣∣ ≥ lsw. If ∣∣ldw∣∣ < lsw, there exists a
critical value (βCr)
∗ of βCr such that for βCr < (βCr)∗ the steady state is
locally stable and for βCr > (βCr)
∗ the steady state is unstable. Furthermore,
(βCr)
∗ is implicitly given by
H (− (βCr)∗) =
lsw −
∣∣ldw∣∣
2lsw
.
Under certain regularity conditions a flip bifurcation occurs for βCr = (βCr)
∗.
Then for βCr close to (βCr)
∗ a period two cycle exists. This period two cycle
merges with the steady state at βCr = (βCr)
∗.
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This result states that if the (absolute value of the) slope of the demand
curve is smaller than the slope of the supply curve the steady state might be-
come unstable. Consider what will happen in such a case. First note that in
the steady state aggregate regret associated with naive expectations is zero,
but there are still information costs to be paid for the rational predictor. Con-
sumers using the naive predictor are therefore better off. Now, if the sensitivity
parameter β is not too large there will always be a sufficient amount of rational
agents to stabilize the wage dynamics. However, if β increases, which is accom-
panied by a rise in the level of competition between different predictors, the
equilibrium value of n will go down. This may destabilize the wage dynamics.
At the critical value (βCr)
∗, as given in the proposition, a period-doubling or
flip bifurcation occurs and a period two cycle emerges (for textbook treatments
of the flip bifurcation, see Kuznetsov 1998, or Guckenheimer and Holmes 1983).
This flip bifurcation may be supercritical or subcritical. For a supercritical flip
bifurcation the period two cycle is stable and coexists with an unstable steady
state (that is, it exists for βCr larger than, but close to (βCr)
∗). For a sub-
critical flip bifurcation the period two cycle is unstable and coexists with the
stable steady state (that is, it exists for βCr smaller than, but close to (βCr)
∗).
For higher values of β even more complicated behavior may occur. Let us
briefly discuss the mechanism driving this complicated behavior. Suppose the
system starts out close to the unstable steady state. In that case aggregate
regret for using the naive predictor will be low and many people from the next
generation will use the naive predictor. This destabilizes the wage dynamics
and large fluctuations in wages may be observed. Aggregate regret will then
go up and subsequently the fraction of rational players in the next generation
will increase. This will stabilize the wage dynamics and wages will be driven to
their steady state values. Simultaneously, aggregate regret for naive predictors
decreases again and we end up close to the initial position. Then the whole
story repeats. This mechanism shows that perpetual fluctuations can emerge
naturally in a framework with an evolutionary competition between different
predictors. In the next subsection we will study a numerical example where
this phenomenon is indeed encountered.
3.2 A numerical example
3.2.1 The schooling decision and the labor market
We assume a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function
U (ct, ct+1) = c
γ
t c
1−γ
t+1 ,
where 0 < γ < 1. The marginal effort level e∗ is found by equating U
(
1− et, wet+1
)
to U (1, 1). This gives
e∗t = e
(
wet+1
)
= 1− (wet+1)−δ,
where δ ≡ (1 − γ)/γ. Furthermore we assume that individual effort costs are
uniformly distributed on the unit interval: F (e) = e.
The production technology employed in sector H is given by
f(l) =
α
µ
lµ,
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where α > 0 is a productivity parameter and 0 < µ < 1. Note that for this
production technology we indeed have liml→0 f ′ (l) > 1 and liml→∞ f ′ (l) = 0 <
1. Existence of a market clearing wage wt+1 is therefore assured for all possible
enrollment rates. Demand for high-skilled labor in period t+ 1 follows as
ld(wt+1) = (
α
wt+1
)
1
1−µ .
Recall that, due to the constant returns to scale technology in sector L, the
demand for low-skilled labor is perfectly elastic.
Given that the newborn generation can choose between the rational and the
naive predictor the equilibrium condition (4) becomes
(
α
wt+1
)
1
1−µ = (1− nt)(1− w−δt ) + nt(1− w−δt+1). (6)
In order to be able to explicitly solve for wt+1 we make the following restriction
on the parameters δ and µ: δ(1 − µ) = 1.3 If we define xt ≡ w−δt then (6) is
linear in xt+1 and can be solved for xt+1 as
xt+1 = G (xt, nt) =
1− (1− nt)xt
αδ + nt
.
The steady state equilibrium wage corresponds to the unique solution to x∗ =
G (x∗, nt) and is given by x∗ =
(
1 + αδ
)−1
< 1, or w∗ =
(
1 + αδ
) 1
δ > 1.
Furthermore, we have lsw = δ (w
∗)−δ−1 and ldw = −δαδ (w∗)−δ−1, implying that
the steady state will be unstable for sufficiently small n∗ if α < 1.
Notice that for xt and nt satisfying xt <
(
1− αδ − nt
)
/ (1− nt) we have
xt+1 > 1, implying wt+1 < 1. Rational agents will foresee this development
and only some of the naive agents will invest in schooling in period t. At a
wage rate for high-skilled labor lower than 1, the high-skilled agents prefer to
work in sector L. This drives a wedge between enrollment in period t and
supply of high-skilled labor in period t + 1. The supply of high-skilled labor
then falls short of demand which will drive up the wage for high-skilled labor.
This wage will increase exactly to the point where it equals the wage in the
low-skill sector. Therefore, the actual development of xt+1 should be written
as
xt+1 = min
{
1− (1− nt)xt
αδ + nt
, 1
}
.
For the cases we consider in this section, the restriction on the wage for high-
skilled labor never turns out to be binding.
3.2.2 Information costs and predictor choice
The model is closed by the specification of the predictor choice. For this we
need to compute aggregate regret of naive agents (individual and aggregate
3Note that this requires that δ > 1 or γ < 12 . For γ > 1/2 we cannot explicitly determine the
market clearing wage wt+1 as a function of wt and nt. However, it will be shown later on that
instability of the steady state and periodic behavior can also occur in this case.
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regret of rational agents will always be zero). Individual regret of naive agents
is given by
R (ei, wt+1) = U (1, 1)− U (1− ei, wt+1) = 1− (1− ei)γ w1−γt+1 .
Aggregate regret becomes
R (wt, wt+1) =
∫ e(wt)
e(wt+1)
R (ei, wt+1) dF (e)
=
∫ 1−w−δt
1−w−δt+1
[
1− (1− ei)γ w1−γt+1
]
de
=
(
w−δt+1 − w−δt
)
− 1
1 + γ
w1−γt+1
(
w
−δ(1+γ)
t+1 − w−δ(1+γ)t
)
.
This can again be written in terms of xt = w−δt , giving
R (xt, xt+1) = (xt+1 − xt)− 1 + δ2 + δx
− 1
1+δ
t+1
(
x
2+δ
1+δ
t+1 − x
2+δ
1+δ
t
)
.
Now that we have determined aggregate regret, all that remains is to specify
the function H (.). In this paper we will make use of the so-called discrete
choice model (see Brock and Hommes 1997), which gives
nt+1 =
1
1 + exp [−β (R (xt+1, xt)− Cr)] .
Other choices for H (.) give the same qualitative behavior of the dynamics.
3.2.3 The full model: theoretical and numerical analysis
The full model is given by
xt+1 = G (xt, nt) =
1− (1− nt)xt
αδ + nt
, (7)
nt+1 = H (xt, nt) =
1
1 + exp [−β (R (G (xt, nt) , xt)− Cr)] .
The steady state and the local stability properties of the steady state are dis-
cussed in the following proposition, which is a straightforward application of
Proposition 1.4
Proposition 2 Consider dynamical system (7). The steady state is given by
(x∗, n∗) =
(
1
1+αδ
, 11+exp(βCr)
)
. For α > 1, this steady state is always locally
stable. For α < 1, the steady state is locally stable (unstable) for βCr smaller
(larger) than (βCr)
∗ = ln
(
1+αδ
1−αδ
)
. At βCr = (βCr)
∗ a flip bifurcation occurs.
4For the case γ > 1/2 it is not possible to explicitly solve for the equilibrium wage, but we
might also have instability and periodic solutions, for βCr sufficiently high. Consider γ = µ = 12 .
It can easily be checked that the steady state equilibrium is then given by w∗ = 12 +
1
2
√
1 + 4α2
and is unstable under naive expectations if and only if α < 12
√
3. By a continuity argument we
have that for α < 12
√
3 there exist an open neighborhood of
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, such that for all (µ, γ) in this
neighborhood the steady state is unstable under naive expectations. Therefore, the steady state will
also be unstable in the full model when the level of evolutionary competition becomes sufficiently
high.
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Figure 2: Period doubling bifurcation curves for the case of rational versus naive
forecasters with α = 0.95 and Cr =
1
4
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Simulations suggest that the flip bifurcation occurring in this system is
supercritical and a stable period two cycle exists for βCr larger than, but close
to (βCr)
∗. If βCr increases further, this period two cycle might lose stability
through a supercritical flip bifurcation of the second iterate of (7), leading to
a stable period four cycle. This period four cycle also loses stability through a
flip bifurcation and a whole cascade of period doubling bifurcations follows.
Figure 2 presents some period doubling bifurcation curves, i.e. curves in the
parameter space along which a bifurcation of the dynamical system occurs.5 In
Figure 2 the parameters β and δ are varied, whereas the other parameters are
kept fixed at α = 0.95 and Cr = 14 . Four different curves are drawn. The lowest
curve corresponds to the first period-doubling bifurcation. This bifurcation
curve was already discussed in Proposition 2 and an explicit expression for it is
given by β∗ = 4 ln
(
1+0.95δ
1−0.95δ
)
. For parameter values of β and δ below this curve
the steady state is locally stable. For parameter values of β and δ above this
curve but below the next one, the steady state is unstable and there exists a
stable period two cycle. At the second bifurcation curve this period two cycle
becomes unstable and a stable period four orbit is created, which becomes
unstable at the third bifurcation curve, and so on. Infinitely many of these
period doubling bifurcation curves can be drawn and, as should already be
apparent from Figure 2, they are closer to each other the higher the periodicity
5These curves are computed with the LOCBIF program (Khibnik et al. 1992).
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of the cycles.
Figure 3 shows a typical bifurcation scenario for α = 0.95, Cr = 14 , δ = 2
and different values of β. On the horizontal axis β is varied from 0 to 60 and for
each value of β the resulting long run dynamics of wages is plotted. From this
bifurcation diagram we indeed see a cascade of period doubling bifurcations
eventually leading to the case where the wages move over a whole interval.
From Proposition 2 (and Figures 2 and 3) we know that the steady state
loses stability at β = β∗ = 4 ln 76139 ≈ 11.88. The upper left panel of Figure 4
shows the period two cycle created at this first bifurcation in (wt−1, wt)−space,
for β = 20.6 From Figures 2 and 3 we see that at β ≈ 26.91 a period four cycle
emerges, which loses stability again at β ≈ 30.26. The upper right panel of
Figure 4 shows this period four cycle for β = 30. These stable period two
and four cycles are sometimes called attractors, since they attract a large set
of initial states. They therefore capture the long run dynamics of the model.
Besides locally stable steady states and stable periodic cycles, more complicated
attractors are possible. Some examples are shown in the lower panels of Figure
4. The two-piece attractor in the lower left panel, corresponding to β = 40,
emerges after a cascade of period doubling bifurcations. As β increases further
this attractor becomes larger, as can be seen in the lower right panel which
shows the attractor for β = 60. Although the geometrical structure of these
attractors is not very complicated, the corresponding dynamics in the wages
for high-skilled labor is. Wages jump all over these attractors in an erratic
way. In particular, the time series for β = 40 and β = 60 exhibit sensitive
dependence on initial conditions. This means that two orbits generated by
(7) with arbitrarily close initial conditions, will eventually follow completely
different time paths. This property of the time series implies that long run
predictability of wage rates is impossible, even when the system is completely
deterministic. Attractors with sensitive dependence on initial conditions are
sometimes called chaotic. The appearance of these chaotic attractors is a robust
6The graphs in Figure 3 are constructed as follows. System (7) is iterated 6000 times for an
initial condition close to the steady state ((x0, n0) = (x∗ + 0.01, n∗)). Subsequently the first 1000
points are dropped and the last 5000 points are plotted in the state space (wt−1, wt).
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Figure 4: Attractors in (wt−1, wt) space for the case of rational versus naive forecasters
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4
. Upper left panel:
β = 20. Upper right panel: β = 30. Lower left panel: β = 40. Lower right panel:
β = 60.
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feature of our model.
The geometrical structure of the (chaotic) attractors in Figure 4 indicates
that the dynamical system (7) gives rise to a one-dimensional relationship be-
tween wt and wt−1. The graph of this relationship is approximated by the
attractor in the lower right panel of Figure 4. Note that the relationship be-
tween wt and wt−1 is nonmonotonic. In general, a high market clearing wage
in period t− 1 leads to a low market clearing wage in period t and vice versa.
This finds its origin in the cobweb structure of the model. Moreover, for most
values of the wage (i.e. where the attractor has a negative slope) we have that
an increase in wt−1 would lead to a decrease in wt. However, for large values
of wt−1 (say wt−1 > 2.2) a small increase in wt−1 leads to an increase in wt.
This non-monotonicity is due to the fact that if wages in period t− 1 are very
high (and wages in period t − 2 have consequently been very low) aggregate
regret will also be high which will lead a large fraction of the generation born
in period t − 1 to use the rational forecasting rule. This high value of nt−1
will mitigate the cobweb cycle. Moreover, at the largest value of wt−1 (wt−1
around 2.5) the fraction of rational forecasters will be close to 1 and this brings
wt close to its steady state value w∗ =
√
1 + (0.95)2 ≈ 1.38.
The shape of the attractor depends upon whether we show enrollments or
wages over current wages, lagged wages, or wages one period ahead. This
indicates that one would find different relationships between enrollments and
relative wages when confronted with such a data set, depending on how agents’
expectations are modelled empirically.
Figure 5 shows some time series for wages for high-skilled labor, the fraction
of rational forecasters and the enrollment rates into higher education, for the
chaotic attractor from the lower right panel in Figure 4 (i.e., α = 0.95, δ = 2,
β = 60 and Cr = 14). All variables undergo perpetual endogenous fluctuations.
Although the model is deterministic, no exogenous shocks are needed to gen-
erate this persistent up and down behavior in wages and enrollments. At the
beginning of these time series (t = 100) wages are close to their steady state
value and aggregate regret will be modest. In particular, aggregate regret will
be lower than the information costs for obtaining the rational forecast. To-
gether with the high value of β, which indicates a fierce competition between
the forecasting rules, this will lead to a very low fraction of rational forecasters
in the next generation. However, at the steady state labor supply and demand
intersect such that an ‘unstable cobweb’ arises and if the fraction of rational
forecasters is too low, the wage dynamics will be unstable and wages will start
fluctuating. These wage fluctuations lead to an increase in aggregate regret up
to the point where aggregate regret is larger than the information costs for the
rational forecast. When this occurs a very high fraction of the next generation
will use the rational forecast, as can be seen in the sharp peak in the time series
in the middle panel of Figure 5. These rational forecasters stabilize the wage
dynamics and the wage for high-skilled labor will be close to the steady state
again. Then the whole story repeats. Notice that the sharp peaks in the frac-
tion of rational agents and the resulting stabilization of wages for high-skilled
labor correspond to the upward sloping part of the attractor in the lower right
panel of Figure 4.
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The example studied in this section shows that endogenous fluctuations
emerge naturally in our human capital model when there is a strong evolution-
ary competition between different forecasting rules. The next section shows
that this phenomenon is robust with respect to the set of forecasting rules
under consideration.
4 Steady state versus adaptive forecasters
In the previous section we have seen that an evolutionary competition between
perfect foresight and naive expectations in our human capital investment model
naturally leads to the emergence of endogenous fluctuations in wages and enroll-
ment rates. Although these two types of expectation formation are well-known
and useful benchmarks, one might argue that they are rather special. That is,
perfect foresight and naive expectations seem to correspond to the two extreme
cases in expectation formation, where the former corresponds to the most so-
phisticated and the latter to the most unsophisticated forecasting rule. In this
section we will investigate our model with two other, less extreme, forecasting
rules. The newborn generation can choose between the steady state forecast
w∗, which requires to predict the steady state wage differential between high-
and low-skilled work, and an adaptive forecast, which gives a weighted average
of the last two observed wage rates as a prediction for next periods wage rate.
The steady state forecast is more sophisticated than the adaptive forecast, and
we will assume that information costs have to be paid for obtaining it. It will be
shown that the dynamical features of the system with steady state and adaptive
forecasters can be qualitatively similar to those found in the previous example.
Moreover, the present example might generate a type of cyclic dynamics that
was not encountered in the case of perfect foresight versus naive expectations.
4.1 General set-up
Let nt denote the fraction of steady state forecasters and 1− nt the fraction of
adaptive agents. The wage forecast of adaptive agents is
wet+1 = ρwt + (1− ρ)wt−1,
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. The adaptive agents therefore use a weighted average of
the past two wages as their forecast of the next wage. Notice that ρ = 1
corresponds to the naive forecasting rule that was discussed in the previous
section. Steady state forecasters use the steady state wage w∗ as their forecast
for next period’s wage. We assume that information costs Cs > 0 have to be
paid for agents of the newborn generation to find out the steady state (the long
run wage differential between high-skilled and low-skilled work). However, our
results also hold for Cs = 0.
With these two types of forecasting rules market equilibrium (1) is given by
ld (wt+1) = (1− nt)F (ρwt + (1− ρ)wt−1) + ntF (e (w∗)) , (8)
which implicitly defines wt+1 as a function of wt, wt−1 and nt, say wt+1 =
Gs (wt, wt−1, nt).
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The fraction of steady state agents depends upon their forecasting perfor-
mance relative to the forecasting performance of the adaptive agents. As long
as the economy is in its steady state, the former will always have made the
correct schooling decision. However, contrary to agents with perfect foresight,
steady state forecasters may regret their human capital investment decision if
the wage for high-skilled labor is subject to fluctuations. If the actual wage is
above the steady state wage, some of the steady state forecasters that did not
invest in schooling would rather have invested. If the actual wage falls short of
the steady state wage, some agents regret their decision to invest in schooling.
Aggregate regret for steady state agents from period t is therefore given by
R (w∗, wt+1) =
∫ e(w∗)
e(wt+1)
R (e, wt+1) dF (e) .
Moreover, for adaptive expectations we find
R (wt, wt−1, wt+1) =
∫ e(ρwt+(1−ρ)wt−1)
e(wt+1)
R (e, wt+1) dF (e) .
As in the previous example we will assume that the fraction of steady state
forecasters will be driven by the difference between aggregate regret of steady
state forecasters and adaptive forecasters from the previous generation. This
difference is given by
Rd (wt−1, wt, wt+1) = R (wt−1, wt, wt+1)−R (w∗, wt+1)
=
∫ e(ρwt+(1−ρ)wt−1)
e(w∗)
R (e, wt+1) dF (e) .
The fraction of the generation born in period t+1 that expects the steady state
in the next period is then given by
nt+1 = H
(
β
(
Rd (wt−1, wt, wt+1)− Cs
))
. (9)
By introducing an auxiliary variable vt = wt−1, the full model, consisting of
(8) and (9), can be written as the following three-dimensional system of first
order difference equations
wt+1 = Gs (vt, wt, nt) ,
vt+1 = wt, (10)
nt+1 = H
(
β
(
Rd (vt, wt, Gs (vt, wt, nt))− Cs
))
.
We will now discuss the steady state of (10) and its stability properties. First
notice that if all agents are steady state forecasters the wage will be equal to
the steady state wage. On the other hand, if everybody uses adaptive wage
forecasts then the steady state might be unstable if the slope of the demand
curve is smaller, in absolute value, than the slope of the supply curve, i.e. if∣∣ldw∣∣ < lsw. However, this is not a sufficient condition for instability since, for
intermediate values of ρ, the fluctuations in predicted wages (and therefore
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in enrollment rates) will be smaller than fluctuations in actual wages. There-
fore, for intermediate values of ρ, adaptive expectations seem to have ‘better’
stability properties than naive expectations.
Now consider the full model. The steady state of (10) and its stability
properties are summarized in three propositions. The first proposition gives
the steady state and shows that this steady state is stable when
∣∣ldw∣∣ ≥ lsw.
Proposition 3 The steady state of dynamical system (10) is
(w∗, w∗, n∗) = (w∗, w∗,H (−βCs)) .
If
∣∣ldw∣∣ ≥ lsw, the steady state is locally stable.
This result is rather intuitive. If the steady state is stable under naive ex-
pectations, one should also expect it to be stable when there is an evolutionary
competition between forecasting rules that have better stability properties than
naive expectations. The next step is to look at the more interesting case where
the demand and supply curves are such that the steady state would be unstable
under naive expectations, that is,
∣∣ldw∣∣ < lsw. The value of ρ plays an important
role here and we consider two separate cases: ρ > 23 and ρ <
2
3 . The next
proposition deals with the first case.
Proposition 4 Let
∣∣ldw∣∣ < lsw and ρ > 23 . Let nF be given by
nF (ρ) =
ldw + (2ρ− 1) lsw
(2ρ− 1) lsw
.
With respect to the stability of the steady state of (10) we have
1. if 23 < ρ ≤ 12
(
1 +
∣∣ldw∣∣ /lsw) the steady state is locally stable for all values
of βCs,
2. if ρ > 12
(
1 +
∣∣ldw∣∣ /lsw), there exists a value (βCs)∗ of (βCs), corresponding
to n∗ = nF (ρ), such that the steady state is locally stable for βCs <
(βCs)
F , and unstable for βCs > (βCs)
F . For βCs in the neighborhood of
(βCs)
F a period two cycle exists, which merges with the steady state at
βCs = (βCs)
F .
This proposition states that, for ρ > 23 and for a sufficiently high value
of β and/or Cs a flip bifurcation occurs, leading to a period two cycle. This
is similar to what we have seen in the previous section, where we considered
an evolutionary competition between perfect foresight and naive expectations.
The case of steady state forecasters versus naive forecasters is a special case
(ρ = 1) of the current model. The stability analysis of that case follows as a
corollary to Proposition 4.
Corollary 5 Consider the model with steady state forecasters versus naive
forecasters and let
∣∣ldw∣∣ < lsw. Then there exists a critical value (βCs)∗ of
βCs such that for βCs < (βCs)
∗ the steady state is locally stable and for
βCs > (βCs)
∗ the steady state is unstable. Furthermore, (βCs)∗ is implicitly
given by
H (− (βCs)∗) =
lsw −
∣∣ldw∣∣
lsw
.
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Notice that there is a subtle difference between the bifurcation value for
βCs, when agents can choose between the steady state forecast and the naive
forecast, and the bifurcation value for βCr, when agents can choose between
perfect foresight and the naive forecast, as given in Proposition 1. Actually, the
critical value of the fraction of rational forecasters at the steady state is twice
as small as the critical value of the fraction of steady state forecasters. On the
other hand, we may assume that the costs for obtaining the rational predictor
are higher than the costs for obtaining the steady state predictor. Therefore, it
seems reasonable to assume that the fraction of perfect foresight agents indeed
tends to be smaller than the fraction of steady state agents in the steady state.
The following proposition deals with the case ρ < 23 .
Proposition 6 Let
∣∣ldw∣∣ < lsw and ρ < 23 . Let nNS be given by
nNS (ρ) =
ldw + (1− ρ) lsw
(1− ρ) lsw
.
With respect to the stability of the steady state of (10) we have
1. if 1 + l
d
w
lsw
≤ ρ < 23 the steady state is locally stable for all values of βCs,
2. if ρ < 1+ l
d
w
lsw
there exists a value (βCs)
NS of (βCs), corresponding to n∗ =
nNS (ρ), such that the steady state is locally stable for βCs < (βCs)
NS,
and unstable for βCs > (βCs)
NS. For βCs in the neighborhood of (βCs)
NS
an invariant closed curve exists, which coalesces with the steady state at
βCs = (βCs)
NS.
Clearly, the case with ρ < 23 is very different from the case with ρ >
2
3 . The
difference lies in the fact that in the former case the relevant eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix of (10), evaluated at the steady state, are complex conjugates
and cross the unit circle when βCs = (βCs)
NS . This corresponds to a so-
called Neimark-Sacker or Hopf bifurcation (for a textbook treatment of the
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, see Kuznetsov 1998).
The final case we should mention is ρ = 23 . For this value of ρ we have that,
at n∗ = 1+ 3ldw/lsw, the two relevant eigenvalues are real and both are equal to
−1. This is a so-called strong resonance 1 : 2 Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. At
such a bifurcation many interesting phenomena may occur and the behavior of
the dynamical system near such a bifurcation can be rather complicated (see
Kuznetsov 1998).
Figure 6 shows some graphs illustrating the different dynamical scenarios
that are described in the propositions. Each graph gives the curves nF (ρ)
and nNS (ρ) for a different value of the ratio of the slopes lsw/l
d
w. The dotted
line in each of the graphs gives the combinations of n∗ and ρ for which the
relevant eigenvalues become complex (combinations of n∗ and ρ to the left and
above this curve give rise to complex eigenvalues). The curves denoted nNS
and nF show the value of n∗ at which a Neimark-Sacker or a flip bifurcation
occurs, respectively. These figures illustrate what happens in the evolutionary
model for different values of the steady state fraction of steady state agents n∗,
the belief parameter ρ and the relatives slopes of the labor demand and labor
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Figure 6: Stability regions and bifurcation curves for the case of steady state versus
adaptive forecasters. The horizontal axis gives the value of the parameter ρ from the
adaptive forecast, the vertical axis gives the fraction of steady state forecasters n∗ in
the steady state. The dotted line
(
nC
)
gives combinations of ρ and n∗ for which the
relevant eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix become complex, the solid lines denoted
by nF and nNS give combinations of ρ and n∗ for which a flip bifurcation and a
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occur, respectively. Upper left panel: l
s
w
ldw
= −1.25. Upper
right panel: l
s
w
ldw
= −2. Lower left panel: lsw
ldw
= −3. Lower right panel: lsw
ldw
= −4.
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supply curve ldw/l
s
w. Notice that the steady state tends to be “more stable”
for intermediate values of ρ, in the sense that it requires a higher degree of
evolutionary competition, as measured by βCs or n∗, to destabilize the wage
dynamics for these intermediate values. Also observe that nF (1) = nNS (0) =
1 + l
d
w
lsw
and hence the stability properties for the extreme cases ρ = 1 (naive
expectations) and ρ = 0 are the same. Note, that in these two special cases
the system looses its stability in different ways. Finally note that for the lower
panels in Figure 6 the critical values nF and nNS are higher than 12 , for ρ close
to 0 or 1. This implies that, if we make the natural assumption that H (0) = 12 ,
the steady state will be unstable for these values of ρ, even if there are no
information costs to obtain the steady state predictor, Cs = 0.
4.2 Numerical example
As before we consider a Cobb-Douglas utility function and a uniform distribu-
tion of effort costs. The market equilibrium condition (8) becomes(
α
wt+1
) 1
1−µ
= (1− nt)
(
1− (ρwt + (1− ρ)wt−1)−δ
)
+ nt
(
1− (w∗)−δ
)
.
Notice that we can explicitly determine wt+1 as a function of wt and nt for all
admissible values of δ and µ. However, in order to be able to compare this case
with the case of perfect foresighted versus naive agents we will maintain the
assumption δ (1− µ) = 1. We then define xt = w−δt again and find
xt+1 = Gs (xt, xt−1, nt) (11)
=
1
αδ
(1− nt)
(
1− (ρx−
1
δ
t + (1− ρ)x
− 1
δ
t−1)
−δ
)
+
1
1 + αδ
nt.
Regret in terms of xt is easily found to be
Rd (xt−1, xt, xt+1) =
(
x∗ − (ρx−
1
δ
t + (1− ρ)x
− 1
δ
t−1)
−δ
)
− 1 + δ
2 + δ
x
− 1
1+δ
t+1
(
(x∗)
2+δ
1+δ − (ρx−
1
δ
t + (1− ρ)x
− 1
δ
t−1)
−δ 2+δ
1+δ
)
.
The full model, written as a system of first order difference equations, becomes
xt+1 =
1
αδ
(1− nt)
(
1− (ρx−
1
δ
t + (1− ρ)y
− 1
δ
t )
−δ
)
+
1
1 + αδ
nt
yt+1 = xt (12)
nt+1 =
1
1 + exp [−β (Rd (xt, yt, Gs (xt, yt, nt))− Cs)] .
The following result is a straightforward application of Proposition 3.
Proposition 7 Consider dynamical system (12). The steady state is given by
(x∗, n∗) =
(
1
1+αδ
, 11+exp(βC)
)
. For α ≥ 1 the steady state is locally stable for all
values of βCs. For α < 1, we have the following:
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1. if ρ ∈ (23 , 12 (1 + αδ)] ∪ [1− αδ, 23) the steady state is locally stable for all
values of βCs;
2. if ρ > 12
(
1 + αδ
)
> 23 the steady is locally stable (unstable) for βCs <
(>) (βCs)
F , where
(βCs)
F = ln
(
αδ
2ρ− (1 + αδ)
)
.
Under certain regularity conditions a flip bifurcation occurs at βCs =
(βCs)
F .
3. if ρ < 1−αδ the steady is locally stable (unstable) for βCs < (>) (βCs)NS,
where
(βCs)
NS = ln
(
αδ
1− ρ− αδ
)
.
Under certain regularity conditions a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs
at βCs = (βCs)
NS.
We will now discuss the different dynamical features of system (12). Let us
start out with the model with steady state forecasters versus naive forecasters
(ρ = 1). We can compare this to the case, studied in Section 3, of perfect
foresight versus naive forecasters. The upper left panel of Figure 7 shows the
attractor for the case of steady state versus naive forecasters, with α = 0.95,
δ = 2, C = 14 and β = 60. Note the resemblance with the attractor in the lower
right panel in Figure 4. The times series of this model are also very similar to
those of the model studied in Section 3. The dynamics for the two different
models seem to be closely connected. This holds for other parameter choices as
well. The other panels in Figure 7 show attractors for parameter values α = 12 ,
δ = 2 and Cs = 1/4. We then have
∣∣ldw/lsw∣∣ = 4, which corresponds to the lower
right panel of Figure 6. (Note that the steady state will be unstable for any
positive value of βCs when ρ ≤ 1/2 or ρ ≥ 3/4.) First let ρ = 7/10. From
Proposition 4 we know that at β = βF = 4 ln (5/3) ≈ 2.043 a flip bifurcation
occurs and a period two orbit is created. For β slightly larger than βF , wages
for high-skilled labor will then move in a period two cycle. This period two cycle
is shown for β = 2.08 in the upper right panel in Figure 7. The lower left panel
in Figure 7 deals with the case ρ = 610 . From Proposition 6 we know that this
gives rise to complex eigenvalues which cross the unit circle when β = βNS =
4 ln (5/3) ≈ 2.043. At this Neimark-Sacker bifurcation an invariant closed curve
is created. For ρ = 6/10 this Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is supercritical, which
means that for β close to, but larger than βNS , an attracting closed curve exists.
This attracting closed curve is shown for β = 2.08 in the lower left panel of
Figure 7. Wages for high-skilled labor then move over this closed curve. The
dynamics on this curve may be periodic or quasi-periodic. Generically, as β
increases, the system undergoes numerous bifurcations resulting in periodic
orbits on the closed curve. Then two periodic orbits, of the same period, arise
on the closed curve and the dynamics is then periodic (this periodic orbit may
however have a very long period). If for a certain value of β such a periodic
orbit does not exist the dynamics on the closed curve is quasi-periodic: the
orbit of each point on the closed curve comes back arbitrarily close to that
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Figure 7: Attractors in (wt−1, wt) space for the case of steady state versus adaptive
forecasters. Upper left panel: α = 0.95, δ = 2, ρ = 1, β = 60 and Cs =
1
4
. Upper
right panel: α = 0.5, δ = 2, ρ = 0.7, β = 2.08 and Cs =
1
4
. Lower left panel: α = 0.5,
δ = 2, ρ = 0.6, β = 2.08 and Cs =
1
4
. Lower right panel: α = 0.5, δ = 2, ρ = 2/3,
β = 4.4 and Cs =
1
4
.
point but not exactly. The orbit fills up the closed curve completely. The time
series of such an orbit is almost but not exactly periodic.
A subcritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation also occurs in this model. At
such a subcritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation the invariant closed curve exists
for β < βNS and is repelling. Then all orbits starting out in the interior
of the closed curve will converge to the steady state and all orbits starting
outside the closed curve will diverge. The invariant closed curve therefore gives
the border of the basin of attraction of the locally stable steady state. As β
approaches βNS , the closed curve (and therefore the basin of attraction of the
steady state) shrinks until it merges with the steady state at β = βNS . For
β > βNS a closed curve does not exist and the steady state is unstable. Due
to the restriction on the wage for high-skilled labor the wage dynamics will
converge to a period two orbit that cycles between a high wage and a wage
of 1. These subcritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcations occur for ρ < ρ0 ≈ 0.514.
For ρ > ρ0 the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is supercritical and leads to an
attracting invariant closed curve as discussed above. At the parameter value
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(ρ, β) =
(
ρ0,−4 ln (3− 4ρ0)) our dynamical system undergoes a Chenciner
bifurcation. This implies that there is a curve in the parameter space, starting
at the Chenciner bifurcation point and going down in (ρ, n∗)−space, where
the unstable invariant closed curve, created at the subcritical Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation, undergoes a saddle-node bifurcation and two invariant curves, one
lying in the interior of the other, are created. The outer curve is unstable
and the inner curve is stable. For a textbook treatment of the Chenciner
bifurcation see Kuznetsov (1998). Gaunersdorfer, Hommes and Wagener (2001)
also discuss the Chenciner bifurcation in some depth in an evolutionary model
similar to ours. Finally, the lower right panel in Figure 7 shows the attractor
created in the 1 : 2 strong resonance Neimark-Sacker bifurcation at ρ = 23
and β = 4 ln 3 ≈ 4.39. The attractor created in this bifurcation is a very
“flat” invariant closed curve and is shown for β = 4.4. Typically, chaotic
phenomena occur close to Chenciner and 1 : 2 strong resonance Neimark-Sacker
bifurcations.
5 Concluding remarks
Our aim was to endogenously explain variations in enrollments to higher edu-
cation. For that purpose we developed a human capital model with overlapping
generations. In this model agents have the choice to invest into schooling in
the first period of their life in order to earn a higher wage in the second pe-
riod of their life, or not to put effort into schooling and work in the low-skill
sector in both periods. Contrary to other human capital models our agents
are heterogenous in their expectations on the returns to education. An evolu-
tionary competition determines the fraction of agents making ‘not-so-rational’
schooling choices. As access to information is costly, ‘not-so-rational’ agents
use current and past returns on education as a predictor for future returns, un-
less experience of the previous generation indicates that using a more sophisti-
cated prediction rule is advantageous. The interplay of destabilizing backward
looking expectations and a stabilizing sophisticated predictor may generate en-
dogenous fluctuations in the demand for education. No exogenous shocks are
needed to arrive at perpetual changes in enrollments. This holds true, even
under standard assumptions on labor demand, which is downward sloping in
our examples, and agents’ preferences, which are Cobb-Douglas. We illustrated
our point for two different pairs of prediction rules: rational expectations ver-
sus naive expectations in schooling choices, and steady state forecasters, which
are agents who know the steady state wage differential between high-skill and
low-skill jobs, versus adaptive beliefs. The emergence of complicated dynam-
ics is robust against the competitive evolutionary beliefs that we study. The
routes to interesting dynamics are characterized by various sorts of bifurcations,
such as supercritical flip bifurcations, as well as subcritical and supercritical
Neimark-Sacker-bifurcations.
Costs of collecting information and the degree of evolutionary pressure that
arises from the dissatisfaction of previous generations’ schooling decisions are
key for the dynamics of our model. This suggests that policies tearing down
obstacles for collecting information on returns to education may stabilize flows
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to higher education. The reason is that students will less likely make use of
cheap and possibly destabilizing backward looking prediction rules. If it is
more easy to find and process information on future labor market states, more
students will be guided by the ‘true’ wage differentials in their schooling choice.
The model that we developed is parsimonious, mainly for reasons of tractabil-
ity. Extensions of the model may include drop-outs from school, and possibly
a more sophisticated life-time structure. Empirically, it would be interesting
to have time series evidence on agents’ expectation formation, to see whether
it resembles the variation over time generated by our model.
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Appendix: Proofs of main results
In this appendix we provide proofs of the main results from this paper.
Proof of Proposition 1. The steady state follows directly from (5) and
the observations that, at a steady state, rational and naive agents have correct
predictions and regret of naive agents is zero at the steady state. Stability of the
steady state is determined by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated
at the steady state. Taking the total differential of (4) and evaluating at the
equilibrium (w∗, n∗) gives
∂G
∂wt
∣∣∣∣
(w∗,n∗)
=
(1− n∗) lsw
ldw − n∗lsw
and
∂G
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
(w∗,n∗)
= 0.
Furthermore, we have
∂nt+1
∂wt
∣∣∣∣
(w∗,n∗)
= βH ′ (−βC) and ∂nt+1
∂nt
∣∣∣∣
(w∗,n∗)
= 0.
The Jacobian matrix therefore becomes
J =
 (1−n∗)lswldw−n∗lsw 0
∂nt+1
∂wt
∣∣∣
(w∗,n∗)
0

and has eigenvalues λ1 =
(1−n∗)lsw
ldw−n∗lsw and λ2 = 0. The steady state is locally stable
whenever the eigenvalues lie in the unit circle which, in this case, corresponds
to
(1− 2n∗) lsw <
∣∣∣ldw∣∣∣
If
∣∣ldw∣∣ ≥ lsw this condition is always satisfied. However, if ∣∣ldw∣∣ < lsw, then for
all n∗ < l
s
w−|ldw|
2lsw
, the first eigenvalue is smaller than −1, and the steady state is
unstable.
Proofs of Propositions 3, 4 and 6. The steady state follows directly from
(10) and the observations that, at a steady state, wt = w∗ andRd (w∗, w∗, w∗) =
0. For evaluating stability of this steady state we consider the Jacobian matrix
of the linearized system, evaluated at the equilibrium. This Jacobian matrix is
given by
J =

(1− n∗) ρ lsw
ldw
(1− n∗) (1− ρ) lsw
ldw
0
1 0 0
∂nt+1
∂wt
∣∣∣
(w∗,w∗,n∗)
∂nt+1
∂yt
∣∣∣
(w∗,w∗,n∗)
0
 ,
where the elements on the first row are found by totally differentiating the
market equilibrium condition (8). The eigenvalues are given by
λ1,2 =
1
2
(1− n∗) ρl
s
w
ldw
± 1
2
√
(1− n∗) l
s
w
ldw
(
(1− n∗) ρ2 l
s
w
ldw
+ 4 (1− ρ)
)
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and λ3 = 0. First consider the case with lsw <
∣∣ldw∣∣. For the absolute value of
the nonzero eigenvalues we then have
|λ1,2| ≤ 12 (1− n
∗) ρ
lsw
|ldw|
+
1
2
√
(1− n∗) l
s
w
|ldw|
(
(1− n∗) ρ2 l
s
w
|ldw|
+ 4 (1− ρ)
)
<
1
2
ρ+
1
2
√
(ρ2 + 4 (1− ρ)) = 1
2
ρ+
1
2
√
(2− ρ)2 = 1,
and hence the steady state is locally stable when lsw <
∣∣ldw∣∣. Now consider the
case with lsw >
∣∣ldw∣∣. The nonzero eigenvalues are complex conjugates when the
expression under the root is negative, which is equivalent with
n∗ > nc (ρ) ≡ 1 + 4(1− ρ)
ρ2
ldw
lsw
,
otherwise all eigenvalues are real. It can easily be checked that nc is increasing
in ρ, that nc (1) = 1 and that nc (ρa) = 0 for
ρa = 2
ldw
lsw
(
1−
√
1− l
s
w
ldw
)
∈ (0, 1) .
Therefore, for ρ < ρa the eigenvalues are complex for any value of n∗. Now we
investigate what happens when eigenvalues are real and when they are complex,
respectively.
1. Real eigenvalues. If the eigenvalues are real the smallest eigenvalue (cor-
responding to the negative root) is smaller than −1 if and only if
n∗ < nF (ρ) =
ldw + (2ρ− 1) lsw
(2ρ− 1) lsw
.
Hence for n < nF and ρ > ρc the steady state is unstable. Notice that
nF is increasing in ρ and that nF
(
ρb
)
= 0, for ρb = 12
(
1− ldwlsw
)
> 12 .
Furthermore, we have nc (ρ) − nF (ρ) = − 9(ρ−
2
3)
2
ρ2(2ρ−1)
ldw
lsw
, which implies that
nf (ρ) ≤ nc (ρ), for all ρ > 12 .
2. Complex eigenvalues. If the first two eigenvalues are complex a so-called
Neumark-Sacker bifurcation occurs as the determinant of the upper 2× 2
submatrix of the Jacobian equals +1. This happens when
nNS (ρ) =
ldw + (1− ρ) lsw
(1− ρ) lsw
.
Notice that nNS is decreasing in ρ and nNS (ρc) = 0 for ρc = 1 + l
d
w
lsw
.
As can be easily checked, the curves nC , nF and nNS intersect at (ρ, n) =(
2
3 , 1 + 3
ldw
lsw
)
. Therefore, we find that for ρ > 23 , the system undergoes a flip
bifurcation at n∗ = nF (ρ) and the steady state is unstable for n∗ < nF (ρ).
For ρ < 23 , the system undergoes a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation at n
∗ = nNS (ρ)
and the steady state is unstable for n∗ < nNS (ρ).
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